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1. Introduction
Scholars’ explanations of interhousehold transfers serve as allegories for our understanding of
human nature and the social environment that condition human behavior. This topic has
consequently been a source of dispute within most disciplines in the humanities and the social
sciences. Since at least the 17th century, philosophers have disagreed as to whether altruism is
merely apparent, meaning that even states of mind that are directed towards the welfare of others
ultimately aim at advancing one’s own pleasure (Hobbes 1650, Hobbes 1651, Butler 1726).
Within anthropology, substantivists such as Scott (1976) have long argued that transfers arise
from a “moral economy” in which prevailing ethical values such as the virtue of generosity and
individuals’ primordial right to subsistence assure support for the poor, while rationalists such as
Popkin (1979) have countered that what appears to be a moral economy can be wholly explained
by self-interested, opportunistic individual behavior. A fierce debate likewise rages within
contemporary theology on these questions, drawing on Mauss’ classic The Gift (1966) to argue
whether humans ever undertake non-self-interested, non-manipulative giving (Milbank 1997,
Caputo and Scanlon 1999). Examples from other disciplines are not difficult to find.
Economists have engaged this debate as well. Some explain interhousehold transfers as
the result of altruistic preferences or some sort of moral code that constrains individual choice out
of a sense of fairness or noblesse oblige, perhaps complemented by the “warm glow” effects the
giver enjoys from impure giving (Phelps 1975, Andreoni 1989, Samuelson 1993, Coate 1995,
Smith et al. 1995, Kirchler et al. 1996, Barrett 1999). Others explain transfers as an endogenously
supportable insurance mechanism adopted by purely self-interested individuals to cope with an
environment of imperfect information and missing financial markets in which individuals interact
repeatedly (Kimball 1988, Fafchamps 1992, Platteau 1992, Coate and Ravallion 1993, Townsend
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1994).1

We accept the veracity of these two canonical models in explaining some inter-

household transfers. Surely some people provide insurance for one another and some can at least
occasionally be gracious toward those who suffer in their midst. However, the limited empirical
evidence among the East African pastoralists we have been studying intensely for the past several
years casts doubt on the completeness and perhaps even the relative importance of these two
explanations of transfers, as we discuss in the next section.
This paper therefore develops an alternative model in which transfers are a selfinterested, manipulative gesture motivated by the strategic interdependence of individuals sharing
both access to a productive resource and a common social identity in a potentially hostile
environment. In our model, giving is intrinsically costly but can nonetheless be instrumentally
valuable to the giver if it motivates the recipient to undertake a self-interested action that has a
positive spillover benefit for the donor. Put differently, transfers can serve as costly but desirable
coordinating mechanisms among interdependent actors.
This is explicitly not a model of pure altruism, because individuals value only their own
welfare, or a model that relies on impure altruism due to “warm glow effects” (Andreoni 1989),
wherein giving is intrinsically self-interested. Nor is this a model that relies on a patron-client
relationship, in which marked inequalities in wealth, status or power give rise to vertical
insurance systems or exchange of nontraded services (e.g., protection) for tradable goods and
services such as material tribute or labor (Scott 1972, Fafchamps 1992, Carter 1997, Platteau
1995, Ray 1998). In our model, no exchange of services occurs; redistribution occurs only with
limited inequality in wealth and can be either distributionally progressive or regressive. Transfers
occur within a limited wealth space purely due to the material self-interest of both the donor and
the recipient. Finally, this is neither insurance nor investment in social capital, because ours is a

1

A variation on this theme would be that transfers represent current investment in social capital that is
expected to pay future dividends, albeit likely in a form other than that of the original transfer. This is akin
to models of political campaign contributions, wherein donors make financial gifts today with the
expectation of preferential treatment on policy decisions at some future date.
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static model in which transfers do not occur in response to idiosyncratic shocks to agents’ wealth
or income and there is no opportunity for reciprocal behavior.
In our model, a voluntary, self-interested wealth transfer is essentially a side payment for
a migration decision the recipient only prefers ex post, that is, after having received the ‘gift’.
While the transfer may well strengthen the recipient’s inclination towards ‘cooperative’ behavior
(Fehr et al. 1997, Akerlof 1982) or elicit his penchant for reciprocity (Bowles et al. 1997), the
‘service’ the recipient offers – through the migration choice he makes – is unambiguously in his
own interest. Like in the Bernheim et al. (1985) model of strategic bequests, the wealth transfer is
strategic in that it influences the recipient’s choice of actions. Transfers are consequently
manipulative in nature.2 But unlike the individually costly services – such as care, visits, attention
(Cox 1987, Bernheim et al. 1985), sense of worth and status (Offer 1997), and remittances (Lucas
and Stark 1985)3 – considered in prior investigations of exchange-based motives for private
transfers, the service returned by the recipient to the giver in our model is not costly at all, as it
merely originates in the externality effects generated by the recipient’s self-interested, posttransfer choice.4
We motivate and situate our model in the context of east African pastoralists whose
livelihoods depend on the extensive grazing of livestock. One novelty of the current study is that
we identify how transfers can be risk reducing and/or productivity enhancing for the donor
household. As noted by many observers of pastoral economies, the area that a given user group
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This notion of manipulative gifts has been deemed fitting with a variety of exchanges, such as foreign aid
and international support (Lundborg 1998).
3
Like Lucas and Stark’s (1985) theory of remittance behavior, for example, we view transfers as a
mechanism for redistributing the gains from some jointly agreeable action, in our case, from joint migration
to a satellite commons or one party’s evacuation of a base camp commons. As a result, the transfers can
endogenously vanish when the contract is no longer mutually beneficial. Lucas and Stark likewise
recognize that self-interested transfers may prove regressive, with wealthier households receiving
remittances from poorer ones.
4
The recipient’s migration choice, in fact, directly yields immediate own benefits. Our ‘service’ does share
with some of the previous models the important feature of having no close market substitutes. In our
context, security is not a ‘commodity’ on sale. Hiring armed mercenaries is simply not a wise option in
light of the commercialization of cattle rustling and the evidence that cattle rustlers often exploit inside
information (Fleisher 2000).
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calls its grazing area is frequently defined by ambiguous borders (Schlee 1990, Oba 1992, Turner
1999, Goodhue and McCarthy 2000). We argue that the flexible and contested nature of these
boundaries creates an incentive for donor households to support recipient households. Donor
households have an interest in ensuring that their own group remains big enough to maintain
access to contested production areas and to repel attacks by other groups. Insufficient livestock
not only threatens a household with a food security crisis, but also threatens neighboring
households with the potential loss of an ally in a hostile environment due to the existence of
wealth thresholds that determine a household’s ability to migrate (Lybbert et al. 2004). As a
result, progressive transfers may occur from richer to poorer households. The production
externality commonly assumed to exist in common property models is consequently not the full
story of strategic interdependence in certain settings. This production externality must be
balanced against a security externality that arises from the possibility that there is “safety in
numbers”. As many common property resource areas are vast and only loosely controlled by a
state exercising police authority, concerns about security in such areas may be important.
Yet common property resource externalities plainly matter. Indeed, we show that as long
as some basic level of public goods are provided in particular locations, such appropriation
externalities may give rise to distributionally regressive transfers from poorer to wealthier
households. We further argue that declines in mobility and transfers in pastoral areas of east
Africa can be at least partly explained as the result of the exogenous, but local, provision of
public goods. As the state expands its reach into pastoral areas, it brings both security in the form
of police forces and some low-level safety net in the form of food aid. These services are often
confined to areas around towns. This leads certain subpopulations to become more reliant on
exogenously supplied public goods, while others remain more reliant on the endogenous private
provision of public goods. A gradual reduction of the volume of transfers and mobility in
pastoral societies could then be at least partially due to limited, localized provision of public
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goods. Finally, our model offers insights into how the incomplete provision of public services can
lead to non-convex production functions commonly associated with poverty traps.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some background
on pastoralism in east Africa’s arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) as a means to motivate both
the search for an alternative economic explanation of interhousehold transfers and the
assumptions that underpin our model. Section 3 then develops a simple model of myopic
migration choice from those stylized facts and emerges with several important propositions.
Section 4 then relaxes the previous section’s exogeneity assumption with respect to others’
behavior, drawing out the implications for interrelated migration and transfer choices in a
noncooperative, three-agent game. Section 5 concludes by reflecting on the policy implications
of this alternative explanation for manipulative interhousehold transfers.

2. Background on East African Pastoralists

We develop our model around the example of livestock transfers between nomadic pastoralists in
the ASAL of east Africa. These pastoralists’ livelihoods depend almost entirely on extensive
livestock production in regions subject to frequent drought, violent intergroup conflict, and
famine. A household’s livestock herd therefore represents virtually all of its non-labor wealth.
Traditionally, ASAL herders migrated with their herds in search of pasture and water for their
animals. Herders survived mainly by consuming the milk, meat, and blood of their herds. Few
permanent settlements existed in pastoral areas in the pre-colonial and colonial eras. The few
settlements that existed were almost exclusively occupied by traders. Pastoral households would
temporarily occupy areas near these trading points when conditions were favorable and move on
as other areas become more favorable.

6
The boundaries within which households moved were flexible and contested. The
process of groups pushing into new areas or being pushed out of old areas was a constant fact of
life (for northern Kenya examples see Sobania (1979) and Robinson (1984)). Areas that were
accessible to members of a group at one point were not guaranteed to be accessible in the future.
Defense of a given area and of a group’s herds was the responsibility of group members, as was
the potential conquest of neighboring areas. Membership in a social group was thus critical for
ensuring access to grazing lands and security of one’s wealth.
Group membership also involved access to a set of livestock transfer arrangements. East
African pastoral societies are rich in the variety of extant social mechanisms that allow transfer of
animals from one herder to another (Schneider 1979, Perlov 1987, McCabe 1987, Little 1992,
Ensminger 1994). These transfers also served to keep people who had lost their animals as mobile
members of the group able to help provide for the common defense of herds and grazing areas. 5
One of the motivations for this study was that recent empirical work with household data
gathered in pastoral areas came to some surprising conclusions with regard to transfer behavior.
First and foremost, transfer magnitudes are currently far too small to serve as an effective ex post
insurance mechanism (Lybbert et al. 2004, McPeak 2004). If the objective of transfers is to allow
households who suffer unexpected herd losses to reestablish a herd and remain mobile, they are
not large enough to be effective.
In addition, the evidence suggests that transfers do not go to the very poor. Desta’s
(1999) data show that among Borana pastoralists in southern Ethiopia, the poorest and richest
quartiles of herders were only one-sixth and one-fourth as likely, respectively, to receive
5

As noted by historical studies, during periods of severe covariate shock such as the crisis of the late
1800’s, endogenous restocking was impossible (Robinson 1984). Households who lost their herds often
also lost their status as a member of the pastoral group. For example, Samburu nomads who lost their
animals became Dorobo hunter and gatherers. The Wata hunter and gatherers absorbed former Gabra
herders. Former Maasai were absorbed by neighboring ethnic groups that were traditionally cultivators. In
more recent times, households that lose their herds and are unable to restock to a level sufficient to remain
mobile often become permanent residents of the small towns that have grown up in pastoral areas. There
seems to exist a minimum, nontrivial herd size necessary for trekking herders to survive off the herd’s flow
of blood and milk. That minimum of 8-12 cattle (Lybbert et al. 2004) arises because indigenous breeds’
lactation rates are relatively low and multiple herders are required to supervise and guard a herd.
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livestock gifts or loans as the central half of the wealth distribution. McPeak (2004) finds that
relative wealth differences across households in a given period have very little quantitative
impact on transfer flows. Recent findings suggest that transfers often flow from the poor to
relatively better off (albeit still poor) households (Lybbert et al. 2004, McPeak 2004)
It is difficult to reconcile the extant economic literature on altruistic transfers with these
facts about contemporary east African pastoralists. For example, the core prediction of a model
of selfless giving – especially if (potentially impure) altruism is a normal good – would be that
giving increases with wealth and its corollary, that transfers flow disproportionately to the poorest
agents within the system. Maybury-Lewis (1992) describes such a practice, quoting a pastoral
elder who states that transfers occur since “we must give to those who need it, for a poor man
shames us all” (p.85). This contrasts with contemporary empirical evidence that at least among
east African pastoralists the very poor are commonly abandoned, left to turn to begging,
prostitution, and illicit drug and alcohol trade in grim rangeland towns (Little et al. 2001). Not
only are transfers potentially regressive, as documented earlier, but even progressive transfers
from richer households to poorer ones appear to benefit primarily a “lower middle class” within
the population. This pattern is evident in a broader, global history of pastoral cultures routinely
sloughing off their weakest members.
A key feature of wealth transfers among pastoralists is that they seem to occur almost
exclusively within groups defined by some social identity, commonly clan or ethnicity and occur
as part of an ongoing relationship. McPeak (2004) reports that 93% of transfers in his data
occurred between individuals who had a mother’s side, father’s side, or an in-law relationship. In
addition, most transfers took place within an ongoing relationship between giver and receiver;
61% were to individuals from whom animals had been received in the past, and 72% were to
individuals to whom animals had been previously given. Transfers among pastoralists are clearly
socially embedded behaviors, which has naturally led many observers to the conjecture that they
represent a form of social insurance (Torry 1973, Schlee 1989, Oba 1992).

8

A different interpretation in the anthropological literature stresses the risk sharing aspect
of transfers.

Such ethnographic studies have described transfers using terms such as “an

indigenous social security system” (Oba 1992, p. 66) and “insurance against loss from drought,
epidemics and human and animal predators…” (Schlee 1989, p.56). Unfortunately, the informal
insurance argument – the notion that transfers represent compensatory payments for idiosyncratic
shocks among herders - likewise does not seem to offer a compelling explanation of the transfer
patterns observed among contemporary pastoralists in east Africa. While there is indeed some
evidence that transfers respond to herd losses, recent econometric studies find that the flows
involved are very small in relation to the losses suffered. Lybbert et al. (2004) find that Boran
pastoralists in southern Ethiopia receive, on average, a gift or loan of only one head of cattle for
every thirty they lose to mortality. McPeak (2004) finds that herd growth has a quantitatively
small impact on transfer flows, and if anything, transfers tend to go to herders who have
experienced positive rather than negative herd growth in the year prior to the transfer.
Furthermore, herders report that it commonly takes months or even years before an initial request
for a livestock gift or loan induces a transfer. The compensation proportions and lags found in
these recent studies suggest that interhousehold stock transfers among pastoralists offer terribly
meager insurance against asset loss. This calls into question the completeness of insurance
motives as an explanation for transfers in this setting.
We interpret the contrast between the descriptions of transfers found in the
anthropological literature and the findings of the newer economic literature that finds limited
transfers in the same region as reflecting change that has occurred over time. While it is possible
that transfers were relatively small in the past, within pastoralist communities one hears informal
reports that transfers have declined over time. An objective of this study is to provide a
framework to understand what factors could explain such a change.
One’s explanation for why transfers seem to have declined depends fundamentally on
how one understands individuals’ motivation to make such transfers at all. If one adopts a moral
economy view of transfers as reflecting virtues inherent to a culture, then declining transfers
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signal moral decay. One frequently hears such claims today in east Africa. While this is one
possible interpretation, it does not provide a very compelling explanation as it is not clear why the
moral decay occurred.
If one instead subscribes to the view that transfers are largely born of self-interested
behavior, then changing transfer volumes merely reflect changes in incentives created by the
environment within which individuals make such choices. We can identify several key changes
that could have induced the apparently sharp decrease in self-interested transfer behavior. Since
the droughts of the early 1970’s, the provision of food aid to pastoral areas has become
increasingly frequent. Small towns have sprung up around relief distribution sites in the ASAL.
Over the past three years in the six northern Kenyan sites in which we work, no effort has been
made at targeting households. Instead, identical food aid packages are given to all residents who
request them and most households receive food aid every period. So there is basically a lump
sum payment made to those living in and around settlements in the form of exogenously provided
food aid.
Another important change relates to the growing and now relatively high level of
violence in the rangelands. Livestock raiding between ethnic groups has long been a feature of
pastoral areas (Fukui and Turton 1979, Bollig 1992, Markakis 1993, Hendrickson et al. 1996). 6
However, over the past thirty years, the growth in ownership of small arms has made traditional
conflicts over pasture, water, and livestock increasingly lethal as civil strife in Ethiopia, Somalia,
Sudan, and Uganda has created an abundant supply of automatic weapons at low prices (Oba
1992, Hussein et al. 1999, Swift and Kraatli 1999, Osamba 2000, Smith et al. 2001).7
Government security forces rarely are able to stop these conflicts in extensive grazing lands.
Whether due to lack of manpower, supplies, or interest, they more commonly concern themselves
6

Cattle raiding and its attendant violence are occasionally inter-clan within some ethnic groups as well. In
this paper, for the sake of clarity, we oversimplify in assuming violence is solely between ethnic groups.
7
For example, the February 9, 2001, edition of the [Nairobi] Daily Nation (Muiruri 2001) reported on a
raid in the Selolevi area at the borders of Isiolo, Marsabit and Samburu Districts by Samburu bandits armed
with AK-47 assault rifles and sub-machine guns. The bandits killed thirty Boran herdsmen and made off
with an estimated 15,000 head of cattle they had trekked to this more dangerous area in search of water and
pasture following a prolonged period of drought around their base encampments to the northeast.
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with security issues in and around the small towns where they are posted. Government provided
security is largely a matter of protecting town dwellers, while those who are still nomadic are left
to defend themselves as best as they can.
The third key change is that pastoralist mobility is widely perceived to have deteriorated
over the past generation or so due to loss of spatial refugia to expanding rangeland towns, to
extensification of rainfed crop cultivation into traditional dry season grazing areas, to recently
gazetted parks and protected areas, and to violently contested no-man’s-lands (Coppock 1994,
Desta 1999, Fleisher 1999, Heald 1999). Mobility is key to wealth accumulation and conservation
in the ASAL (Little 1994, McPeak and Barrett 2001) because microclimatic variability, soil and
altitude differences, and uneven spatial distribution of animals give rise to patchy and time
varying rangeland carrying capacity and productivity (Behnke et al. 1993, Ellis and Swift 1998).
Social identity matters as well to resource access and has become more fixed over time with the
emergence of permanent town settlements. Much open rangeland and many watering points
continue either unmanaged (open access) or governed by overlapping, “fuzzy” property rights
(Goodhue and McCarthy 1999). These areas are typically contested by multiple social groups.
Other, common property areas surrounding the towns are, by contrast, generally available only to
members of a particular ethnic group or clan.
These changing conditions have led to a division in pastoral societies. Households who
are able to maintain large enough herds to ensure mobility continue to migrate throughout the
extensive grazing lands of the ASAL of east Africa. They are able to survive off of livestock
products away from the small towns that have grown up in the area. These transhumant herders
band together for self defense in insecure areas, thus providing their own security in a hostile
environment.
In contrast, a growing population of former nomads has permanently settled in and
around small towns. These households no longer have a herd that is large enough to survive on in
the extensive grazing lands, and seem unable to reestablish one through livestock transfers or
market-mediated restocking (Little et al. 2001, Lybbert et al. 2004, McPeak and Barrett 2001,
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McPeak and Little forthcoming). They therefore remain in the settled area, relying on perhaps a
small herd or petty trade to provide some income, or, most troubling, becoming reliant on
humanitarian relief or dangerous, illicit activities (Nduma et al. 2001, Little et al. 2001). The
pressure of these settlements on the fragile resource base around these towns has also led to a
pattern of localized degradation that further diminishes the productivity of the livestock held by
the town-based poor (Schwartz et al. 1991, McPeak 2003).8 The prospects for town dwellers that
have lost their herds are therefore often bleak, and have been described by various authors as a
“poverty trap” (O’Leary 1987, Legesse 1989, Little et al. 2001). Legesse (1989) argues that the
nature of poverty differs between these town dwellers and the nomadic population. He writes (p.
273)
“...For a few years after the long drought, many nomadic
families continued to live a marginal existence depending on
very small herds, on livestock loans, and on daily gifts of food
from friends and kinsmen. They experienced seasonal hunger
and sometimes had to supplement their nomadic income with
income obtained by herding the stock of wealthier families and
urban merchants. In short, there is a form of rural poverty
among the nomads, which is far less visible than the poverty of
the peri-urban squatters. The two forms of poverty, however, are
sharply different because the stigma that is associated with the
latter is absent in the former. The nomads do not view poverty
as a state of being but as an acquired trait. One does not become
poor, one catches poverty, like a cold. Everybody has, at one
time or another, caught this particular ailment.” (italics in
original)
Nathan et al. (1997) provide anthropometric evidence that supports this view; children of town
dwellers are demonstrably worse off than the children of nomads.
In the following section, we develop a model that captures and explains many of the facts
just reported. We illustrate the interconnectedness of herd mobility, herd size, and transfers and
show how the localized provision of relief food and security can influence these relationships.
This permits explanation of both the apparently striking change over time in transfer behavior

8

The use of woody resources for construction of houses, fencing, and for fuelwood decreases tree cover,
while the localized grazing pressure of town-based livestock further damages rangeland productivity.
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among pastoralists and the current observed transfer patterns that appear consistent with neither
prevailing economic theories of altruistic preferences nor of social insurance and reciprocity.

3. A Model of Individual Migration Choice

The analysis in this section focuses solely on a single agent’s binary decision over whether to
migrate his herd or not and aims at elucidating the differential and conditional impacts of
migration determinants. This analysis is partly for its own sake, as it helps explain some stylized
facts about pastoralism and apparent changes in the rangelands. It is also foundational, for in
section 4 we will generalize these behaviors to allow for the simultaneous, strategically
interdependent behaviors of multiple agents and allow the propositions with respect to migration
derived in this section to inform our understanding of the evolution of interhousehold transfers
among east African pastoralists.
The essence of the model we present is that there exist two externalities, an appropriation
externality associated with potential site-specific overgrazing – the classic “tragedy of the
commons” effect – and a physical security externality reflecting “strength in numbers” effects
vis-à-vis hostile common opponents. Which of these effects dominates in a given setting depends
on herd sizes across agents in different ethnic groups, the level of external transfers available, and
prevailing ecological conditions on the range. As we will show in section 4, when the public
security externality dominates, some modestly wealthier agents may be willing to make limited
strategic asset transfers to somewhat poorer kinfolk in order to induce allies to migrate with them
to a potentially dangerous location. When the appropriation externality dominates, some poorer
folk may be willing to transfer wealth to slightly richer (but still poor) kin in order to induce them
to migrate away and thereby relieve pressures on the common property grazing area. These
patterns give rise to precisely the sorts of current transfer patterns reported in the previous
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section, and can explain the shift over time that seems to have taken place in pastoralists’
interhousehold transfer behavior.

This framework is likewise consistent with the common

sociological observation that individuals sharing a common identity frequently appear as allies in
one setting (e.g., when faced with a common adversary) and as competitors in other domains
(e.g., over scarce forage and water for their herds).
We structure the model in such a way as to underscore that neither insurance nor altruism
could motivate the transfers that endogenously result. The agents in our model are purely
materially self-interested, so altruism plays no role; there are not even opportunities for selfinterested “warm glow” effects from giving. Also, ours is a static model, so insurance contracts
cannot exist because they would be reneged upon in equilibrium. We use this structure not
because we do not believe that altruism or insurance are factors in the complex reality of east
African pastoralism, but rather to isolate this new mechanism we model, which seems to offer a
conceptual reconciliation with the empirical evidence on east African pastoralists that extant
models of transfers fail to provide.

a. The agents and locations
Consider a two-area setting (respectively, a base camp near an established settlement, B, and a
satellite area, S). Define the livestock carrying capacity of each area aЄ{B,S}, denoted Lamax(RFa),
as the maximal number of animals that can be placed on that plot without causing a decline in its
productive potential. Carrying capacity is increasing in the stochastic rainfall realizations on an
area, RFa. Rainfall is drawn from a normal distribution with parameters N(µa ,σ a 2). Area-specific
per animal productivity,9 fa(RFa)Є[0,∞], is increasing in realized rainfall. Satellite areas have
higher intrinsic productivity than base areas, fS(RF)>fB(RF) for identical rainfall, and the rainfall
distribution in the satellite area first-order stochastically dominates that in the base area. Hence,
herds’ unconditional expected productivity is strictly higher in the satellite area than at the base

9

Productivity here reflects the production of consumption goods: milk, blood and meat.
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area. For the same ecological reasons that productivity is higher there, satellite area carrying
capacity exceeds base area carrying capacity for identical rainfall realizations, LSmax(RF) >
LBmax(RF).
Let there be three different herders representing two different, mutually hostile ethnic
groups. Herders i and j share a common ethnic identity and are thus allies in any inter-ethnic
conflict; k hails from the rival group. The herd size distribution {Li,Lj,Lk} is common knowledge.
Each herder makes a discrete decision whether or not to migrate from his base camp area to the
satellite area (m=1 for migration, 0 otherwise).10 No pastoralist ever migrates to the base camp
area of another ethnic group, so inter-ethnic resource competition is purely in the satellite area.
For the remainder of this section we study herder i’s migration choice, mi, conditional on the
migration choices of the others, mj and mk, so as to be able to focus on the determinants of
pastoralist migration. In the next section we relax this exogeneity assumption and explore the
strategically interdependent migration decisions of the three herders and the distributionconditional transfer regime that results endogenously.

b. Appropriation and security externalities
When the number of animals occupying an area exceeds its variable carrying capacity,
productivity-degrading overgrazing results.

Hence, in the event of excessive resource

competition, an appropriation externality arises, wherein one herder’s migration choice affects the
productivity of other herders’ animals. The herders (sharing a common identity) in the base area
thus become competitors. Let δa= (Lia+ Lja + Lka)/ Lamax(RFa) express the area-specific occupancy
rate as a proportion of its rainfall-dependent carrying capacity.11 Then we can define the expected
proportional per animal productivity loss due to the appropriation externality as ηa(Lia,Lja,Lka,RFa)
= (δa-1)/ δa if δa≥1 and ηa = 0 if δa<1. This implies that herder i’s expected productivity loss at

10

We assume that no herder can be prohibited from moving by other members of his clan. If multiple
herders each choose to move from one site to another, they necessarily do so together.
11
Note that by construction, LkB equals zero.
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the satellite area is weakly increasing in other herders’ migration decisions, ∂ηS /∂mj, ∂ηS /∂mk ≥0.
Of course, herder i’s expected productivity loss at the base area is also weakly decreasing in his
kinsman’s migration decision, ∂ηB /∂mj ≤ 0.
Production is increasing in area-specific growth potential and actual rainfall. The
common property appropriation externality negatively affects the production function only when
the area-specific carrying capacity is exceeded. In the absence of the common property
externality, the pastoralist’s production is unambiguously increasing in individual herd size.
Other herders’ migration decisions matter not only because of prospective resource
competition.

If herders i and k both migrate to the satellite area, then there is a positive

probability that conflict will erupt, leading to a loss of animals. This risk of raiding and violence
arises only when pastoralists who belong to a different social group jointly occupy a single area.12
Pastoralists of a same social group will never raid or act violently against each other. Rather,
there is strength in numbers in the sense that the presence of another member of a herder’s ethnic
group reduces his expected losses due to raiding and violence through a security externality
Hence, a common identity in the satellite area makes pastoralists allies. Denote this risk, again
expressed as an expected proportional per animal productivity loss, as Φ(θLis/(Lis+Ljs))mk, where
Φ(.) is some density function defined over the closed interval [0,1] with Φ(0)=0.13 If the rival
pastoralist does not migrate, mk=0, then there is zero expected loss. The base camp area always
enjoys zero expected loss since rival groups do not try to occupy the common property lands of
another group. If herder k does migrate, then i’s expected loss is increasing in the universally
known exogenous violence probability parameter14, θ, and in i’s share of his ethnic group’s

12

Today, violence and raiding risk only exist in the satellite areas of the hinterland. The town-based
provision of public security services in the form of police protection provides reasonable assurance against
raiding losses around towns; we simplify this to perfect assurance in the model. Prior to the introduction of
town-based public services a few generations ago, however, there was no practical distinction between base
and satellite areas, so more land was contested and raiding threats were nearly omnipresent.
13
Since security critically depends on human labor rather than herd size, our model implicitly assumes that
the treks are made in fixed proportions herder/herd size.
14
This measure of the general risk probability merely reflects the availability and trafficking of weapons in
the region, and the climate of despair amongst the pastoralists (say, as a result of recurrent droughts).
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livestock on the contested terrain. The implication is that a rise in the number of livestock
migrating from the same social group creates a public good security externality.
An important trade-off now emerges. On the one hand, if i and j both migrate, then the
presence of more pastoralists from i’s ethnic group creates a positive security externality against
raiding if and only if k also moves to the satellite area. On the other hand, it also generates a
negative resource appropriation externality if and only if the resulting occupancy rate exceeds the
area’s carrying capacity.

c. Exogenous transfers and movement costs
As mentioned in section 2, food aid has become nearly ubiquitous in the rangeland towns of the
East African ASAL. We incorporate this important feature through the introduction of an
exogenous transfer from outside the system, τ, which pastoralists only receive if they are at base
camp, where they have ready access to town-based distribution of relief food.15 This geography of
food aid distribution creates a fixed cost to migration.16 If a pastoralist chooses to leave the base
camp for higher expected productivity satellite areas, he faces a fixed opportunity cost of τ. In
addition to this fixed cost of foregone food aid, the migrating pastoralist incurs variable
movement costs, mc(Li), that are monotonically increasing and concave in herd size, and mc(0) =
0. This cost reflects the animal weight loss and risk of injury or loss to wild predators incurred on
the migratory trek.

15

Recall from section 2 that food aid distribution in the region is typically independent of a pastoralists’
wealth, so we treat this as a lump sum that is identical for all pastoralists. Our assumption that food aid is
available only in the base camp is an obvious oversimplification. The key feature is that leaving the
satellite area to come to town to receive food aid entails a nontrivial fixed cost. For simplicity’s sake, we
model this cost as prohibitive.
16
There are, of course, prospective benefits to being near town other than just receipt of food aid and police
protection: access to markets and a thus a wider variety of consumer goods, more timely information from
the outside world, etc. These other location-specific amenities merely reinforce the basic logic of our
model, however, that the rise of localized provision of public services change the dynamics of a wide range
of human behavior, including migration and transfer patterns.
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d. The pastoralist’s migration choice
We assume pastoralists maximize expected income conditional on others’ simultaneous choices
(mj, mk) that affect payoffs. Utility is assumed to be increasing in income.17 The choice problem
facing pastoralist i is thus

( )

Max E Y i

m i ∈{0 ,1}
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The first term represents pastoralist i’s payoff associated with a choice of migrating to the
satellite area, whereas the second term captures his payoff when staying at the base area. Both
terms include an expression for the pastoralist’s effective herd productivity, defined as his ex ante
herd size adjusted for the expected impacts of the appropriation and security externalities and
multiplied by the site-specific per animal productivity. Let us label this gross total product Pa,
with

(2) PS
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and

(3) PB ≡ (1 − η B )Li f B (RFB ) .

Pastoralist i then rationally decides to move to the satellite camp (mi=1) if and only if he
expects to reap at least as high or higher net benefits from doing so relative to staying at the base
camp (mi=0). This logic yields the movement decision rule that pastoralist i chooses mi=1 if and
only if:
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i
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Rearranging the terms and dividing both sides of the inequality by Li yields the following
necessary and sufficient migration condition:18
17

For expositional purposes, we present our model for the case of risk-neutral agents only. Risk aversion
merely complicates the analysis without adding substantially different insights.
18
The lefthand side of (4) reflects a measure of general migration appeal, common for all pastoralists
facing the same locational choice. The value of Ω by contrast is individual-specific since it is in part

18
(4) f S (RFS ) − f B (RFB ) ≥ Ω
where

Ω≡
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As shown in Figure 1, the site-specific productivity differences give steeper slope to Ps
than to PB, as long as the probability of livestock raiding and conflict is sufficiently small.
Formally, the necessary condition underlying the graphical representation in Figure 1 is:



Li
 < 1 − (1 − η B ) f B (RFB )
 Li + m j L j 
(1 − η S ) f S (RFS )


(1 − η B ) f B (RFB )
(5’) With
<1
(1 − η S ) f S (RFS )

(5) m k Φθ

The inequality (5’) holds true so long as at least one of two conditions is met: the value of ηB
exceeds ηS and/or fS(RFS) is sufficiently greater than fB(RFB).19 Our subsequent analysis assumes
that the site-specific differences are effectively such that the above condition is satisfied for any
possible value for the risk of raiding or violence. In the absence of site-specific lump sum food
aid transfers and variable movement costs, all pastoralists would move, as they did generations
ago. But those costs of moving induce pastoralists with smaller herds to choose to stay at base
camp and suffer lower productivity. PS therefore single crosses PB+τ from below, and once the
difference between the two productivity functions at least equals mc(Li), then the pastoralist
optimally chooses to migrate, creating an observed productivity function that is convex in wealth
even though the site-specific production technologies are strictly concave.20

determined by agent i’s individual herd size, Li. For any fixed herd size, this migration condition is satisfied
as long as τ and mc(Li) are sufficiently small. This underscores how point-based free food aid distribution
discourages migration, leading to increased herd concentration in base camp areas, an observation borne
out empirically in the region (McPeak 2003). More generally, however, the returns to migration depend
fundamentally on mj, mk, θ and τ.
19
If both conditions are violated, then our discussion of migration choice becomes trivial. Indeed, no herder
would wish to migrate at all. Hence, in the remainder of our analysis, we assume that at least one of these
underlying conditions applies. In the absence of any risk for livestock raiding or violence, the slope of PS
necessarily and unambiguously surpasses that of PB.
20
In this regard, there is some similarity to the occupational choice model of Banerjee and Newman (1993).
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Define the individual-specific migration threshold, Li*, as the minimum herd size
necessary to make migration to the satellite area preferable.21

Evidently, each particular

combination of parameter values, production functions and migration strategies chosen by the
other herders affects the migration threshold.

For any given combination, however, this

specification generates a monotone, piecewise concave income function that is globally convex in
herd size, with a kink point at Li* (Figure 2). The threshold effect implies that ceteris paribus
pastoralists with a herd size below Li* find themselves in a low-level equilibrium of the sort
described for this region empirically by Lybbert et al. (2004) and McPeak and Barrett (2001).
We now wish to identify how this migration threshold and migration condition change
with marginal changes in a number of parameter values. An increase in i’s ex ante herd size
affects the likelihood that he opts to migrate. Wealthier pastoralists are more likely to migrate to
the satellite area if and only if
∂Ω
≤0
∂Li
(6)
⇔
 ∂η
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Given our earlier specification of the variable movement costs function, the righthand side of the
inequality is necessarily positive and increasing in the size of food aid transfers and the degree of
concavity of the variable movement cost function. In other words, a marginal increase in
individual herd size is more likely to trigger migration to the satellite area if the associated
reduction in average total migration costs is sufficiently high.22
The two terms on the lefthand side of the inequality correspond with the productivity loss
caused by an incremental change in individual herd size respectively at satellite and base area. At
the base area, a rise in individual herd size (weakly) negatively impacts the individual’s

21

That is, Li* is the individual-specific threshold herd size that makes the migration condition hold with
equality: fS(RFS) -fB (RFB) =Ω (Li* ). In what follows, we let Ω (Li*)=fS(RFS) -fB (RFB)≡ Ω*.
22
Formally, the righthand side of condition (6) is identical to the negative of the derivative of (τ/Li +
mc(Li)/Li) with respect to Li.
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production outcome solely through its effect on the area-specific appropriation externality. At the
satellite area, a marginal change in individual wealth generates an additional indirect effect on the
pastoralist’s production outcome, namely via a change in the individual’s security externality.
Wealthier individuals are more likely to move to the satellite area if the difference in the expected
production losses across base and satellite area is sufficiently great, favoring a move to the
satellite area. In the case where following a marginal increase in individual herd size, the new
occupancy rates at both areas still lie below their respective capacity stocking rates, the weak
inequality is necessarily satisfied for sufficiently small induced changes in the expected
production loss due to raiding at the satellite area. This leads to our first proposition.

Proposition 1: A larger individual herd increases the probability that the individual’s
migration condition is fulfilled as the gap between the induced production losses across
base and satellite area increases and as the marginal migration costs decrease.

We now impose a necessary condition, which ensures that a marginal rise in an
individual’s herd always induces a rise in the probability that he will migrate to the satellite area.
Ceteris paribus, wealthier pastoralists are more likely to migrate to the satellite area only if
i
i 
 

(7) f S (RFS ) ∂η S + m k ∂φ  −  m k φ ∂η S + η S m k ∂φ  <  τ + mc L − mc' L  + f B (RFB ) ∂η B
i
2
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( )

If a marginal rise in individual herd size leaves the satellite appropriation externality unchanged
and the risk of raiding is absent (mk=0), then the above inequality always holds. On this basis, we
make the following assumption so that the model corresponds with the empirical regularities of
east African pastoralists.

Assumption 1: Heterogeneity across rangeland carrying capacities is such that, together
with sufficiently high marginal changes in migration costs in response to herd size

21

changes, wealthier pastoralists are ceteris paribus more likely to migrate than poorer
pastoralists.

We are also interested in understanding how an increase in wealth of a (non)migrating
ally influences one’s incentive to migrate. Two cases are separately considered: mj=1 and mj=0.
Making use of the Implicit Function Theorem, we can rewrite the marginal effect of the herd size
owned by one’s clansman on the individual’s migration threshold as:
i*

(8)

∂L

∂L j

∂Ω *
=−

∂Ω *

∂L j
∂Li*

In the case of mj=1, the numerator of (8) takes the form
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Given assumption 1, the denominator is strictly positive. It is now useful to introduce the notions
of strategic complementarity and strategic substitutability. If in response to a marginal increase in
j’s herd size at the satellite area, pastoralist i is more likely to migrate to the satellite area, then the
migration decisions of both pastoralists are defined as strategic complements. Mathematically,
strategic complementarity requires that
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In words, the positive security externality effect generated by an increase in pastoralist j’s wealth
(∂Φ/∂Lj) must be sufficiently high to outweigh the inextricable nonpositive appropriation
externality effect. Clearly, if the rangeland conditions at the satellite area are such that the new
occupancy rate still lies below its carrying capacity, then the requirement for strategic
complementarity will unambiguously hold. In that case, a marginal rise in wealth of pastoralist j
generates only a positive public goods security externality, enhancing pastoralist i’s expected
benefits from migrating. Conversely, in the absence of the risk of livestock raiding (mk=0), the
requirement for strategic complementarity will never be satisfied.
The corollary is that the migration choices of pastoralist i and j constitute strategic
substitutes if a marginal increase in pastoralist j’s wealth induces an upward shift in pastoralist i’s
migration threshold. Mathematically, this situation emerges when

 ∂η
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This expression formalizes the case wherein an incremental rise in the herd size owned by the
migrating ally reduces pastoralist i’s incentive to migrate, all other things held equal. This holds
when the induced negative appropriation externality outweighs the positive security externality
effect in the satellite area.
In the case of mj=0, the numerator of (8) becomes
(13)
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23

The concepts of strategic substitutability and complementarity apply in this context as well, but
now as they relate to the base camp area and the decision not to migrate (mj=0). When a marginal
increase in wealth of a non-migrating pastoralist j lowers pastoralist i’s migration threshold,
thereby encouraging him to vacate the base area and dispersing the ethnic group across space,
their migration strategy choices are conceived to constitute strategic substitutes. The case of
strategic complementarity never arises with mj=0 because there is no security externality in the
base camp, only a non-positive appropriation externality. Hence, with mj=0, a rise in the number
of cattle owned by herder j at the base area therefore either causes a downward shift in herder i’s
migration threshold or leaves the threshold unaffected. The latter case holds if, despite the
increase in the occupancy rate at the base area, the base area’s carrying capacity remains
unsurpassed. These findings lead to our second proposition.

Proposition 2: A marginal increase in the herd size of a migrating pastoralist j lowers
pastoralist i’s migration threshold if and only if the induced positive security externality
effect outweighs the parallel negative appropriation externality effect. A marginal
increase in the herd size of a non-migrating pastoralist j never raises pastoralist i’s
migration threshold.

Change in external food aid transfers likewise affects pastoralist i’s migration behavior. By
similar use of the Implicit Function Theorem, one can readily establish that a rise in food aid
transfers unambiguously increases pastoralist i’s migration threshold by increasing the fixed cost
of migration.23 As a consequence, the required minimal herd size to make migration attractive
increases in the level of freely available food transfers.

23

In the interest of brevity, we omit the proof. A formal proof of this and other omitted (but we believe
straightforward) claims to follow, all using the same Implicit Function Theorem technique that led to
Proposition 2, are available on request from the authors.
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Proposition 3: An increase in the total amount of freely available transfers raises
pastoralist i’s migration threshold.

If pastoralist k chooses not to migrate from his own base camp area, then there is no risk of
conflict and therefore no security externality between pastoralists i and j. The only relevant case
to check is therefore where mk=1. A marginal rise in pastoralist k’s herd size (weakly) increases
pastoralist i’s migration threshold. From i’s perspective, migration loses appeal because of the
heightened probability of raiding, a potential appropriation externality, or both if pastoralist k
herds more animals at the satellite area.

Proposition 4: If pastoralist k stays at his base area (mk=0), then his herd size does not
affect pastoralist i’s migration threshold. Otherwise, pastoralist i’s migration threshold
is increasing in pastoralist k’s herd size.

Rainfall obviously influences pastoralist i’s equilibrium migration strategy. Different
assumptions about the correlation between the rainfall distributions at base and satellite area will
generate different insights. In the event of increased rainfall in the satellite area, holding base area
rainfall constant, pastoralist i’s migration threshold necessarily falls because productivity away
improves. A marginal increase in rainfall also increases the carrying capacity of the satellite area,
possibly reducing ηS and thereby creating further productivity gains, as shown in the equation
below.24
(15)
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Conversely, if rainfall increases in the base area, holding satellite area rainfall constant,
pastoralist i’s migration threshold increases because it stimulates base area livestock productivity
24

Increased rainfall in the satellite area also increases fS(RFS) (in the lefthand side of inequality (5)). The
gap between the lefthand side and the righthand side of the migration condition (5) thus increases, making
it more likely that the migration condition indeed holds true.
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both directly and indirectly by potentially mitigating local appropriation externalities by
increasing the base area’s carrying capacity.25 In sum, microvariability induces pastoralists to
follow the rains, migrating if it falls in the satellite area, staying if it falls around the base camp.
If the marginal change in rainfall is uniformly distributed across both the satellite and
base areas, as often happens in time of drought, then this perfectly correlated incremental change
in rainfall increases the [fS(RFS) -fB (RFB)] at a decreasing rate (given first-order stochastic
dominance and decreasing marginal productivity of rainfall). Rainfall of course also affects Ω.
Together, a marginal increase in rainfall at both satellite and base areas generates a downward
shift in the pastoralist i’s migration threshold.

Proposition 5: A marginal change in rainfall favoring the satellite (base) area induces a
downward (upward) shift in pastoralist i’s migration threshold. Pastoralist i’s migration
threshold falls in response to a spatially uniform change in rainfall.

The final relation we seek to establish in this section relates to change in the exogenous
risk parameter, θ. When mk=1, an increase in the exogenous risk of raiding, perhaps due to the
spread of modern weaponry or to increased interethnic tension due to greater resource pressure,
diminishes pastoralist i’s expected payoff from migrating and thus dampens his propensity to
migrate. If mk=0, then θ has no impact on i’s migration choice, yielding our final proposition.

Proposition 6: With mk=1, an increase in the exogenous risk of raiding generates an upward
shift in pastoralist i’s migration threshold.

25

Higher rainfall in the base area diminishes [fS(RFS) -fB (RFB)] by a factor which is greater than the
induced reduction in the value of Ω. Accordingly, ceteris paribus, increased rainfall in the base area makes
it less likely that the migration condition is fulfilled.

26

The insights summarized in the six preceding propositions lay the foundation for the next
section, in which we explore the transfer choice as the rational outcome of pastoralists’ strategic
interdependence through both appropriation and security externalities. The tradeoffs between risk
of violence and livestock raiding and stocking rate pressures on common property rangelands
create a limited space in which either distributionally progressive livestock transfers from richer
herders to poorer ones or distributionally regressive transfers between the ex ante poor are both
equilibrium outcomes of the simultaneous choice of the three herders under particular
combinations of ecological conditions, ex ante herd distributions, external transfer volumes, and
the exogenous probability of violence. This matches the empirical evidence on east African
pastoralists that extant theories cannot readily explain.

4. Three-person non-cooperative migration game

The preceding section treated the decision of pastoralist i in isolation from the simultaneous,
interdependent choices of the other two pastoralists so as to better understand the nature and
determinants of the crucial migration choice. In this section, we now treat the three pastoralists’
decisions as a noncooperative game of simultaneous migration and transfer choices in order to
tease out the conditions under which transfers emerge in equilibrium in the absence of altruism or
repeated interactions that might permit endogenously enforceable informal insurance contracts.26
The intuition of the results we develop runs as follows, building directly on the previous
section’s propositions. The larger an individual’s herd, the greater the incentive to migrate to the
satellite area, ceteris paribus. When stocking rate pressures on the open range are low or
nonexistent and there is real risk of conflict with an opponent, a relatively wealthy, migrating
26

The ‘wealth transfer-migration choice’ exchange mechanism we identify does not rely on reputation
effects or the repeated character of the interaction at all (Folk Theorem). Despite the fact that in reality
these self-enforcing contracts may well be repetitive, the essence of the repeated game nevertheless lies in
any one period play. Hence, we develop a static model.
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pastoralist may then benefit from manipulating a poorer ally’s independent migration choice by
transferring animals to him and thereby inducing him to move voluntarily, and thus to fight
alongside the bigger herder against their common foe.27 However, some pastoralists are so poor,
perhaps due to an adverse, idiosyncratic shock, that the transfer necessary to induce them to
migrate is excessive relative to the security externality benefits the wealthier herder would enjoy.
As a consequence, the resulting egalitarian transfers are limited in two crucial senses.
First, they are limited to the transfer level necessary just to bring one’s ally to his migration
threshold and thereby induce him to move – and fight – alongside the donor.28 Second, they are
limited only to ally households that are below but reasonably near the migration threshold
anyway, so that the security externality benefits can justify the cost of the animals given away.
One outcome of this limited rational egalitarianism is that the poorest members of the
ethnic group do not receive internal transfers (just external transfers of food aid), have herd sizes
too small to migrate, and are consequently trapped in a relatively low productivity equilibrium.
This gives rise to a second, distinct type of manipulative transfer. If overstocking pressures are
significant around the small towns in which the poorest are trapped, some of the poor may find it
in their interest to transfer an animal to a wealthier herder whose ex ante herd size lies just below
his migration threshold, inducing the wealthier recipient to move and thereby increasing the
productivity of the remainder of the poorer donor’s herd. There thus exist state-dependent
interdependencies between migration choices undertaken by pastoralists sharing a common social
identity, manipulative interhousehold transfer behaviors, and low level productivity equilibria.
Without loss of generality, let i be the wealthier of the two herders in the ethnic group (Li
≥ Lj). Herder k, who is initially located at his own base area, different from that of i and j, may
have more or less animals than either of his rivals, although the herd size distribution is common
27

While one herder may try to induce another herder to accompany him in his trek to the satellite area, it is
assumed that nobody has the capacity to exclude any group member from moving with him. We thus rule
out the possibility that a poor herder must pay a richer ally for ‘protection’ during his move.
28
Note that if the herder refuses to accept the transfer offered by the donor, then his outside option is to
stay in the base area. Hence his threat point is defined by his expected utility from staying when the other,
richer group member nevertheless prefers to move out.
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knowledge. Given the discrete, simultaneous migration decision by these three agents, in theory
there exist eight different combinations of strategies that can possibly emerge. However,
Proposition 1 rules out two of these possibilities because if i does not choose to migrate, then
neither will j move because migration incentives are increasing in herd size. Figure 3 depicts the
feasible strategy space of six migration/no migration combinations.
The problem, from pastoralist i’s perspective, is now one of maximizing expected income
subject to the independent choices of pastoralists j and k.

Each of the three herders is

simultaneously solving the migration choice problem in (1). The key now is to recognize that
their common social identity can create an incentive for either i or j to offer his fellow group
member a side payment in the form of an interhousehold livestock transfer, in order to induce the
other to migrate. To be more precise, i’s migration choice now becomes
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where βij is the transfer from i to j, chosen by i only if mi=1, which is a necessary condition for
strategic complementarity.29 Intuitively, βij>0 only when the transfer is necessary and sufficient to
induce j to migrate, an incentive compatibility constraint, and when the security benefits to i of j’s
migration outweigh the costs of both relinquishing wealth and potentially creating or aggravating
the resource appropriation externality in the satellite area, an individual rationality constraint.
The latter condition is closely related to the notion of strategic complementarity defined in
proposition 2. The minimum transfer necessary to induce j to move will be βijmin=max(L*j|mi=1 –Lj,

29

We will shortly consider the possibility of βji = - βij, but abstract from this for the moment.

29

0).30 If herder j already owns sufficient livestock that he benefits from migrating to the satellite
area irrespective of whether he is given additional animals, there is no need for i to make a
transfer: βijmin=0. If, however, Lj is sufficiently small that without the transfer i believes that
mj*=0, then a stock transfer may be in i’s interests. Define βijmax as the transfer level that would
leave herder i indifferent between making a transfer and moving to the satellite area alone.
Obviously βijmax> 0 if and only if strategic complementarity exists, i.e., if j’s presence in the
satellite area confers more in security benefits than it takes away through resource competition.
Put these two conditions together and equilibrium positive transfers must fall in the
interval [βijmin, βijmax]. No transfers result if βijmax< βijmin or βijmin=0. This is the sense in which
transfers are limited in volume and can exclude both the poorest and richest pastoralists under
contemporary conditions. If the migration threshold is reasonably high, perhaps because food aid
distribution is significant, carrying capacity is low and raiding risks are great, then the necessary
transfer to induce j’s migration may well exceed i’s reservation transfer level. We conjecture that
over time, the changes in the east African ASAL described in section 2 have caused [βijmin, βijmax]
to become an empty set in many cases, thereby explaining why significant past interhousehold
transfers have fallen markedly.
Although transfers will only occur among pastoralists of the same social identity, they
need not always be distributionally progressive. If either herder is willing to migrate based on his
ex ante herd size, then βij>0 is the only transfer in equilibrium. This result obtains because i will
always be willing to migrate when j is willing to migrate, since the only difference in their choice
problem is their ex ante herd size and, by proposition 1, the migration threshold is decreasing in
herd size so there will be no transfers from j to i, βji=0 if L*i < Li. If, however, neither i nor j have
ex ante herd sizes sufficient to justify migration, the possibility of regressive equilibrium transfers
arises. The logic depends on the notion of strategic substitutes, as defined in the previous section.

Note that pastoralist j’s migration threshold (L*j|mi=1) is, like before, defined by equation (5) with
equality, but now takes into account pastoralist i’s reduction of own herd size following the minimal
transfer.
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If herd sizes in the base camp area are sufficient to induce significant appropriation externalities
and pastoralist i’s herd size falls just below his migration threshold, then a livestock transfer from
the poorer household, j, to the richer-but-still-poor household, i, may be mutually beneficial.31
Somewhat more formally, the minimum transfer necessary to induce i to move would be
βjimin=max(L*i|mj=0 –Li, 0). Now define βjimax as the transfer level that would leave herder j
indifferent between making a transfer intended to induce i to exit the base camp common
property and sharing those grazing areas in spite of the overstocking pressures.

Strategic

substitutability is necessary but not sufficient for βjimax> 0, just as strategic complementarity is
necessary but not sufficient for βijmax> 0. If the transfer necessary to induce i’s migration is no
greater than the maximum transfer j is willing to make to have the base camp grazing area to
himself, then a regressive transfer in the interval [βjimin, βjimax] takes place in equilibrium.
Finally, in equilibrium βjk=βik=0 since increasing k’s herd size only increases the
likelihood that k migrates to the satellite area, thereby both increasing local stocking rates and
thereby potentially creating or aggravating the resource appropriation externality and creating
conflict risk. The same argument works in the opposite direction, causing βki=βkj=0.
So let us now summarize by considering the feasible options in strategy space in turn.
The top row of Figure 3 presents the cases where mk=0, in which case no strategic
complementarity exists, so βij=0. Since there is no prospect of security externalities, the only
manipulative transfers that could exist in equilibrium would be regressive transfers meant to
relieve the resource appropriation externality. These will necessarily only be offered if j’s gift
induces i to migrate while j remains at the base camp (mi=1, mj=0). In this setting, transfers
represent a Coasian mechanism to resolve the resource appropriation externality. Such regressive
31

In theory, variable returns to scale – initially increasing, then decreasing – could also give rise to the
coexistence of progressive and regressive transfers. One would see the regressive transfers at the low end of
the wealth distribution, as poor herders seek to hand over their herd to the bigger herders, and the
progressive at the upper tail as the wealthy herders reduce their herds through transfers to smaller
neighbors. We know of no empirical evidence to support the variable returns hypothesis in this setting,
however, and each of the several animal scientists we asked discounted this explanation as highly unlikely.
Among other reasons, there would exist serious agency problems (the transferee could sell or slaughter the
extra animals and simply claim they were eaten by wildlife predators), as similarly reflected in the lack of
any significant hiring of herders (unlike in West Africa).
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transfers could, in theory, occur regardless of whether k migrates to the satellite area. However,
because L*i|mk=1≥L*i|mk=0 following Proposition 4, βjimin|mk=1≥ βjimin|mk=0. In words, the transfer
necessary to induce i to vacate the base area is necessarily larger when i expects to then face k in
a contested satellite area. This necessarily implies that regressive transfers to a pastoralist who
then has to fight for his grazing land are both less likely and, when they occur, larger than
regressive transfers to those who do not ultimately have to fight.32
The possibility for limited progressive manipulative transfers arises when Li ≥L*i|mk=1 and
Lk≥L*k|mi=1, so that there is known positive probability of ethnic violence in the contested or open
access grazing areas. Under those conditions, strategic transfers within a social group may be
mutually advantageous to i and j. Progressive interhousehold transfers intended by i to induce j to
migrate and fight alongside him necessarily occur only if all parties ultimately move to the
satellite area, fostering ethnic conflict over scarce resources (mi= mj= mk=1), as shown in Figure
3.
Figure 4 depicts the relevant βijmin and βijmax curves for a given set of parameters {Li, Lj, Lk,
rfa, fa, θ, τ}. The shaded area reflects the set of feasible progressive transfer in equilibrium, which
depends on how i and j interact. For ease of exposition, we hereafter assume i chooses βij
unilaterally, subject to satisfying j’s incentive compatibility constraint to migrate, implying that
βij= βijmin.
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As defined earlier, βijmin is a linear, decreasing function of Lj with unit slope in

absolute value that is positive only below L*j.34 The willingness-to-transfer function, βijmax, can
never be positive below L*i, and is concave in Li thereafter, increasing so long as the marginal
change in the appropriation externality is dominated by the marginal change in the security
externality, thus increasing expected per animal productivity for i:
32

For the sake of completeness, we note that when Li<L*i, so that mi=0, it follows that mk=0 if Lk<L*k| mi=
m =0 and mk=1 if Lk≥L*k| mi= mj=0. In words, herder k moves if he has a large enough herd size and there
is no strategic interdependence. Similarly, if Lk<L*k| mi= 1, then mk= 0 regardless of whether Lj≥L*j.
33
Given a finite set of fellow community members, however, j may enjoy some bargaining power and be
able to extract a greater transfer, although never beyond the βijmax individual rationality constraint imposed
by i’s choice problem. We leave this bargaining game refinement to future work.
34
Recall from section 3 that the exogenous factors, including the ex ante herd distribution, determine L*j by
establishing the differential range productivity, fixed and variable movement costs, and the range
appropriation and physical security externality values. So βijmin changes with those parameters too.
j
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(17)

∂η s
∂L j


 Li   ∂Φ
1 − m k Φ  i

 L + L j   + ∂L j (1 − η s ) <0






The result is that not only are transfers limited to within the social group, but the fact that βijmax is
decreasing in Li beyond some threshold point and that βijmin is decreasing in Lj limits the wealth
space within which progressive interhousehold transfers will occur as well.

The poorest

pastoralists (e.g., those in the neighborhood of Lj=0 in Figure 4) will receive no wealth transfers
and the biggest herders will make no transfers. This is a limited rational egalitarianism in which
distributionally progressive transfers flow from an “upper middle class” to a “lower middle class”
as a result of agents’ identity-dependent strategic interdependence.

This model thus yields

empirically testable hypotheses that contrast with both the insurance model prediction, where net
transfers covary positively with asset shocks but are unrelated to wealth, and with the prediction
of the canonical altruism model, where net transfers are monotonically increasing in wealth. We
leave for future work empirical investigation to try to identify what proportion of observed
transfers is best explained by each model.
The set [βijmin, βijmax] may be empty. Figure 5 depicts how a decrease in Lsmax, the satellite
area carrying capacity, might extinguish transfers in equilibrium.35 Because more rival animals
occupy the rangeland, L*i and L*j both increase, per proposition 3, and the resource appropriation
externality effect becomes more pronounced, diminishing the prospective benefits to i of a
migration by j. Relative to the base case depicted in Figure 4, this increases βijmin and decreases
βijmax for any {Li, Lj}, potentially extinguishing herder i’s incentive to manipulate j’s migration
choice through a stock transfer.
A situation where no equilibrium transfers occur is more likely to arise as the exogenous
risk of raiding parameter increases, the carrying capacity at the satellite area decreases (leaving
no scope for cases where the induced positive security externality surpasses the negative
competition externality), the base-satellite productivity differences are low and the level of food
transfers is high. Such parameter value shifts reflect the stylized changes over the past generation
35

We assume that the decrease in carrying capacity is not sufficient to induce k not to migrate.
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in conditions on the east African rangelands described in section 2 and may help explain the
apparent reduction in interhousehold transfers observed among pastoralists there.

5. Conclusions

The model developed in this paper effectively reconciles ethnographers’ observations a
generation or more ago of widespread, significant livestock transfers between pastoralists, with
contemporary econometric evidence that interhousehold transfers are exceedingly small in
volume, offer meager insurance against asset loss, and commonly flow from poorer to richer
households rather than vice versa. Based on a model that integrates interhousehold transfer
behavior with individuals’ interdependent migration decisions, we establish an alternative
underlying source of the decline in scope, size and frequency of interhousehold transfers among
pastoralists. Our model exposes how exogenous changes (in carrying capacity, violence, food aid,
etc.) may have played a critical role in sharply reducing interhousehold wealth transfers among
pastoralists. This hypothesis is the only one we can find that is consistent with the mass of
ethnographic, range science and economic evidence on which we draw. Unfortunately, it is not
itself directly testable with available data. Nor would we expect new data to shed much light on
this phenomenon since we are trying to explain an important phenomenon that has largely
vanished, it seems.

The theoretical model nonetheless provides an alternative, integrated

understanding of pastoralists’ migration and interhousehold transfer behavior with significant
policy implications.
A fundamental implication of our model is that the apparent decline in interhousehold
transfers need not reflect declining solidarity or morality within pastoral communities. The intraethnic group transfers long observed in these settings can be explained satisfactorily as the
rational calculus of pastoralists willing, de facto, to pay their friends and neighbors to do battle
with them or to vacate a shared space that is otherwise overcrowded. The fact that such voluntary

34

exchanges take place less frequently today than previously can then be understood as a natural
consequence of changing environmental conditions rather than as a sign of cultural decline.
The implication, of course, is that policy and project interventions can further change the
biophysical and socioeconomic environment in which pastoralists make migration and transfer
choices, perhaps inducing a renaissance in progressive interhousehold transfers or maybe
(unintentionally) further discouraging such acts. Our model suggests that the provision of townspecific public services – modeled here as police protection and food aid distribution – induces a
natural decline in private giving. While welfare may be increased due to the provision of public
services and external transfers and the displacement effect need not be one for one, the incentives
to undertake manipulative transfers decline. These incentives could be reversed through other
public investments not yet taken. In particular, interventions to reduce inter-group violence –
e.g., through serious conflict resolution intermediation efforts or the geographic expansion of
police protection – and to maintain or increase rangeland carrying capacity through improved
water and range management can stimulate pastoralist mobility, which remains the key to welfare
and wealth accumulation among these peoples, and thereby encourage anew progressive
interhousehold transfers.
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Figure 1: Productivity and Income at Different Sites
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Transfers Conditional on Optimal Ex Post Migration Choices
(cell entries are the value of the transfer)
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Figure 4: Limited Progressive Transfers in Equilibrium
(conditional on mi = mk =1)
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(conditional on mi = mk = 1)
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